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Conflicts In Class Actions and Protection
of Absent Class Members
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates early judicial
determination of whether a suit can be maintained as a class action.' After
examining the factual and legal positions of the named representative and
of class members, the trial judge must determine whether utilization of the
class action device is appropriate.' At a minimum, the judge must be satis-
fied that the suit meets the class action prerequisites of numerosity, com-
monality, typicality, and adequacy of representation.
This Note analyzes the extent to which the certification process protects
absent class members. It discusses the information relevant to class certifi-
cation and the deficiencies of the several methods employed to obtain that
information. The Note proposes a regulated system of precomplaint attor-
ney-class communication that would encourage class attorneys to solicit
information necessary for an informed class decision. The regulated com-
munication, will enable the class attorney to assess more accurately the
propriety of a class suit while simultaneously minimizing the dangers tra-
1. Rule 23 provides: "As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a
class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained." FED. R. CIV. P.
23(c)(1).
2. See Horn v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, 23 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 489, 492 (10th Cir. 1977)
(even where named plaintiffs fail to move for class certification court has independent obligation to
determine propriety of class suit); Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 74 F.R.D. 24, 36 (N.D. Cal.
1977) (trial court's class certification decision must necessarily pass on maintainability of class action),
afild in part, rev'd in part, 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980); 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1785, at 128 (2d ed. 1972) (court has independent obligation to assess
facts and determine propriety of proposed class action) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER].
3. Certification constitutes a formal judicial declaration that all the class prerequisites have been
met. Failure to comply with any of these prerequisites may preclude maintenance of a class suit
because of the potential prejudicial impact on the legal rights and claims of the absent class members.
See generally Comment, Class Actions: Certification and Notice Requirements, 68 GEO. L.J. 1009,
1025 (1980). In addition to these prerequisites proposed class action suits must fall within at least one
of the three types of class actions prescribed in Rule 23(b):
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would
create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical
matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or
substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to
the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief
with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
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ditionally associated with attorney-initiated communication. If a class suit
is filed, the trial court, equipped with the solicited information, will be
able to monitor and protect more effectively the interests of absent class
members.
I. The Class Certification Device as a Mechanism to Protect Absent
Class Members
The court's management responsibility typically includes timely deter-
mination of class status, regardless of whether either party has made a
motion for certification." The trial judge must guard the interests of absent
class members.' If there are antagonisms among class members or between
the named representative and the class, the judge is obliged either to deny
class status6 or to attempt a reconciliation of the disparate interests.' Rule
23 provides a variety of procedural mechanisms-such as subclassing,8 in-
4. The ambiguous phraseology of Rule 23(c)(1) has generated much controversy over whether the
proponent of the class suit or the court bears the burden of seeking class certification on a timely basis.
Compare Peritz v. Liberty Loan Corp., 523 F.2d 349, 354 (7th Cir. 1975) (plaintiff bears burden of
seeking certification) with Horn v. Associated Wholesale Grocers 555 F.2d 270, 274 (10th Cir. 1977)
(trial judge obligated to take up class issue whether or not requested to do so by a party). Since the
certification process is designed, in part, to protect absent class members, the latter position is more
consistent with the class rule. See Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23,
43 F.R.D. 39, 41 (1967) (importance of class certification to rights of absent class members may make
it unacceptable to leave to parties control over timing of certification determination).
5. See Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 331 (1980) (trial judge has duty to
protect interests of absentees); Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1346 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 1351 (1981) (trial court overseeing class suit must be sensitive to conflicts within
class, well-informed on views of objectors, and must serve as guardian of absentee interests). Develop-
ments-Class Actions, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1477 (1976) (trial judge has duty to protect absentee
interests).
6. See, e.g., Martin v. Easter Publishing Co., 73 F.R.D. 678, 684 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (class certifica-
tion denied in sex discrimination employment suit because plaintiff's allegations showed circumstances
to be unique); Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 70 F.R.D. 656, 666 (N.D. Cal. 1976), modified on other
grounds, 528 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1975) (certification denied where plaintiff failed to show class
shared all legally relevant characteristics); Page v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 332 F. Supp. 1060, 1071
(D.N.J. 1971) (class treatment denied unless more representatives added). But cf. Muth v. Dechert,
Price & Rhoads, 70 F.R.D. 602, 606 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (denial of certification inappropriate unless
defendants can show prejudice to proposed class).
7. See, e.g., Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 74 F.R.D. 24, 39 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (court
reconciled conflicts by redefining class and creating subclasses although not urged in pleadings) affd
in part, rev'din part, 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980); c Gibson v. Local 40, Supercargoes & Checkers,
543 F.2d 1259, 1264-65 (9th Cir. 1976) (trial judge should narrow class to appropriate scope rather
than deny class altogether).
8. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 179 n.16 (1974) (subclasses can be utilized to
resolve conflicts among class members); Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1349-50 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1351 (1981) (subclassification appropriate when class members hold
divergent views and court believes it would materially improve representation); Monarch Asphalt
Sales Co. v. Wilshire Oil Co., 511 F.2d 1073, 1077 (10th Cir. 1975) (subclasses properly created
when two groups within class were more divergent than similar).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4) authorizes the trial judge to create subclasses "when appropriate ... a
class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class.. ." See generally Develop-
ments-Class Actions, supra note 5, at 1479 (subdassing provides trial judge with means of increas-
ing reliability of representation of absentees).
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tervention,9 bifurcation, ° and exclusion t-to accomodate conflicting inter-
ests within a class and to prevent prejudice to absentees. The court can
use these techniques to modify or redefine12 the proposed class so that the
representative suit meets the mandates of due process.
Three of the four prerequisites to class certification-commonality,
typicality, and adequacy of representation-are intended to safeguard the
interests of absent class members, by reducing to an acceptable level possi-
ble conflicts of interest among class members or between the named repre-
sentative and the class."3 These three prerequisites are interrelated, and
9. Rule 24 provides for mandatory and discretionary intervention. FED. R. CIV. P. 24. See Devel-
opments-Class Actions, supra note 5, at 1483 (provision for intervention necessary if full range of
absentee interests is to be effectively represented in class litigation). Since intervention is prospective
and thereby requires the identification of possibly antagonistic or unrepresented interests before the
absentees are aware that their interests may be in jeopardy, a court may encounter difficulty in at-
tempting to identify and induce particular absentees to come into the lawsuit. Id. at 1483.
Intervention before class certification may upgrade the adequacy of representation. See, e.g., Mc-
Causland v. Shareholders Management Co., F.R.D. 521, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (permissive interven-
tion granted to ensure adequate class representation); First Am. Corp. v. Foster, 51 F.R.D. 248, 251
(N.D. Ga. 1970) (intervention of right by class members to broaden representation). Intervention may
be utilized to avoid mootness, thereby protecting the absent class members. Norman v. Connecticut
State Bd. of Parole, 458 F.2d 497, 499 (2d Cir. 1972) (dismissal of civil rights class action unless
member of class granted leave to intervene); Vanguard Justice Soc'y v. Hughes, 19 F.E.P. 587, 592
(D. Md. 1979) (in fairness to members of class decertified for inadequate representation claims held
open for 30 days to permit adequate class representative to come forward).
10. See, e.g., Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., F.R.D. 24, 37-38 (N.D. Cal. 1977)
(where conflict may arise with respect to relief, bifurcation of liability and relief phases appropriate to
continue class suit), afTd in part, rev'd in part, 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980); Partain v. First Nat'l
Bank 59 F.R.D. 56, 59 (1973) (bifurcation of liability and damage issue precludes dismissal of class
suit).
Bifurcation is frequently employed in Title VII class actions where it attempts to guarantee absen-
tees participation in the remedy which may consist of back pay or other affirmative injunctive relief.
See generally Edwards, The Back Pay Remedy in Title VII Class Actions: Problems of Procedure, 8
GA. L. REV. 781, 797 (1974) (advocates use of bifurcation in Title VII class actions for protection of
absentees).
11. See Developments-Class Actions, supra note 5, at 1486-87 (judicial use of exclusion one way
to resolve conflicts of interest problem provided excluded class carefully defined).
12. See Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 78 F.R.D. 352, 357 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (class redefini-
tion available tool to deal with problems of class dissimilarity); Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways,
74 F.R.D. 24, 36 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (in rendering certification decision court must arrive at its own
tentative definition of class on whose behalf action may be maintained), af'd in part, rev'd in part,
649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980).
13. Conflicts or antagonisms among class members or between the named representative and one
or more subclasses may preclude a class suit. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44-46 (1940) (class
suit precluded when requested relief would directly injure some or all class members); Bailey v. Ryan
Stevedoring Co., 528 F.2d 551, 553 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom, Longshore Workers, Int'l.
Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Bailey, 429 U.S. 1052 (1977) (if significant proportion of class members
voice opposition to action, conflict may be sufficient to deny class status); In re Value Line Special
Situation Fund Litigation, [1973-74 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,601 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) (class certification denied because interest of class representative could be pursued only at ex-
pense of interests of all class members). But see United States v. Trucking Employers, 75 F.R.D. 682,
688 (D.D.C.) vacated 561 F.2d 313 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (critical question regarding class certification is
what degree of dissimilarity among class members can be tolerated without sacrificing fairness to
absentees). The mere existence of some degree of class conflict or disagreement does not automatically
preclude certification. See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation v. State, 85 F.R.D. 701, 706 (N.D.N.Y. 1980)
(possibility of antagonistic interests prevent certification only if extends to subject matter of litigation);
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overlap is inevitable. The different emphases of the requirements are
nonetheless essential to ensure a fully considered certification decision. 4
Commonality requires an identifiable pattern or practice affecting a de-
finable class in common ways.15 For example, commonality in a Title VII
employment discrimination lawsuit is contingent upon the uniformity of
the challenged employment practices with respect to factors such as size of
the work force, number of plants and installations involved, and diversity
of employment conditions, occupations, and work activities. Commonality
also requires consideration of the length of time covered by the allegations
and the likelihood that similar conditions prevailed throughout the rele-
vant period.
The typicality requirement necessitates a slightly different analysis.'6
Gill v. Monroe County, 79 F.R.D. 316, 327 (N.D.N.Y. 1978) (mere existence of intraclass antago-
nisms does not automatically defeat motion to proceed as class); Rutherford v. United States, 429 F.
Supp. 506, 509-10 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (not fatal to maintenance of class that some members preferred
violation of rights to go unremedied); Grogan v. American Brands, 70 F.R.D. 570, 582 (M.D.N.C.
1976) (disagreement among class members not sufficiently antagonistic to preclude certification).
14. Once a class is certified vindication of the legal rights of class members is the responsibility of
the class attorney and the class representative. See Greenfield v. Village Indus., 483 F.2d 824, 832 (3d
Cir. 1973) (representative plaintiff and class attorney have fiduciary duty to absent class members);
Cullen v. New York State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 435 F. Supp. 546, 560 (E.D.,Y. 1977), appeal
dismissed, 566 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1977) (granting class status places attorney for named plaintiffs in
position of public trust and responsibility vis-a-vis absent class members).
15. See, e.g., Bailey v. Ryan Stevedoring Co., 528 F.2d 551, 553-54 (5th Cir. 1976) (lack of
requisite commonality where there exists merely aggregation of individual complaints rather than
common pattern, practice or policy); Jamerson v. Board of Trustees, 80 F.R.D. 744, 748 (N.D. Ala.
1978) (commonality requires examination of commonality of relationship among class claims). Some
commentators, have suggested that commonality is unnecessary or at least partially redundant. They
contend that common questions are an essential ingredient of a class action under any of the Rule
23(b) categories, and that implicit in a (b)(1), (b)(2) or (b)(3) action is the decision that common
questions are shared by class members. 3B J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.06-1 (2d
ed. 1976); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 1763, at 609-10.
The Advisory Committee Notes do not clarify what the commonality analysis requires, and courts
have failed to provide a uniform or consistent pattern of analysis. Compare Green v. Wolf Corp., 406
F.2d 291, 300 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969) ("common and consistent course of
conduct") with Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 74 F.R.D. 24, 39 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (tripartite
analysis-claim is justiciable, named plaintiff a class member, claim asserted common to class), a1f'd
in part, rev'd in part, 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980).
16. The typicality prerequisite refers to the claim or defense of the class representative and not to
the specific facts from which the action arose or to the relief sought. Factual differences among class
members will not render a class atypical. The claim must arise, however, from the same practice or
course of conduct that gives rise to the absentees' claims and must be premised upon the same legal
theory.
The typicality requirement has been equated with the Rule 23 (a)(4) requirement that the repre-
sentative party must adequately represent the class, or with one of the elements usually considered as
part of this adequacy requirement, that the interest of the representative party be coextensive with the
interests of the other members of the class. J. MOORE, supra note 15, at § 23.06-2. The scope of the
term has prompted the suggestion that there is no need for the 23 (a)(3) typicality prerequisite since
all meanings attributable to it duplicate other requirements in Rule 23. Id. But see.Taylor v. Safeway
Stores, 524 F.2d 263, 270 (10th Cir. 1975) (subsection (a)(3) has a meaning independent of other
provisions of Rule 23(a)). Advocates of the Taylor position recommend an (a)(3) analysis in which the
focal point is the representative plaintiff's claims in relationship to the claims of the putative class. Id;
Poindexter v. Teubert, 462 F.2d 1096, 1097 (4th Cir. 1972) (dismissal of class action sustained on
ground that plaintiff's claim not typical of claims and defenses of class). See Jamerson v. Board of
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Are the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff's claim typical of those
surrounding the claims of the class members? Will the relief sought by the
plaintiff be beneficial to the class, and will the plaintiff seek to benefit the
class rather than just himself? In the Title VII example, the court must
consider whether the plaintiff's position, occupation and terms and condi-
tions of employment are typical of those he purports to represent.
Since final judgment in a class action is binding on all class members,
due process requires that the nature and quality of the representation be
tantamount to a "day in court" for the absentees." Courts use a two-tier
inquiry to evaluate adequacy of representation."8 First, the court must de-
termine whether the representative party's attorney is qualified, exper-
ienced, and capable of conducting the litigation. 9 Second, the court must
be satisfied that there are no antagonistic interests within the class, 0 that
may undermine the legitimacy of class representation,21  despite the exis-
Trustees, 80 F.R.D. 744, 748 (N.D. Ala. 1978) (typicality requires that claims and defenses of repre-
sentative typify those of the class).
17. See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-45 (1940) (interests of party not before court
must be adequately represented to bind absentees by judgment); Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 70
F.R.D. 656, 666 (N.D. Cal. 1976), modified on other grounds, 528 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1975) (class
members whose interests are antagonistic to or in conflict with interests of representative party cannot
be bound consistent with requirements of due process); Westcott v. Califano, 460 F. Supp. 737, 746
(D. Mass. 1978) (certification process important to protect absent class members against mootness of
named plaintiffs claim and to facilitate enforcement of favorable judgment); cf. In re Fine Paper
Litigation, 632 F.2d 1081, 1086 (3rd Cir. 1980) (certification is significant step in class litigation
establishing certain rights and obligations of class members and representatives); Mendoza v. United
States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1344, 1346 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1351 (1981) (representa-
tive suits carry inherent dangers of conflict and compromise of absentee interests); Gonzales v. Cas-
sidy, 474 F.2d 67, 68 (5th Cir. 1973), afid on other grounds, 493 U.S. 76 (1974) (judgment in class
suit not res judicata for absentees unless adequately represented); see generally Developments-Class
Actions, supra note 5, at 1366-72 (whether absentee interests reinforce or diverge from interests of
named plaintiff is relevant factor in adjudication).
18. Adequacy of representation is the most crucial requirement of the class action rule, since the
judgment in a class action conclusively determines the rights of absent class members. See Hansberry
v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41-42 (1940).
19. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968) (essential concomitant of
adequate representation that class attorney be qualified, experienced and generally able to conduct
litigation), vacated and remanded, 417 U.S. 156 (1973). The court can provide additional counsel if
necessary to provide better representation of absentee members. Cullen v. New York State Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 435 F. Supp. 546, 560 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). See generallyJ. Moore, supra note 15, 123.07 [1.-
1 ] (adequate representation requirement entails inquiry into competence, experience and vigor of class
counsel).
20. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44-46 (1940) (whether representative's interests conflict
with class members interests is critical consideration in determining adequacy of representation). The
requirement of a lack of conflict has been variously articulated by the courts. See, e.g., Epstein v.
Weiss, 50 F.R.D. 387, 392 (E.D. La. 1970) (identity of interests essential for adequate representa-
tion); Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 11, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) ("coincidence of interests"); Shulman v.
Ritzenberg, 47 F.R.D. 202, 206-07 (D.D.C. 1969) ("compatible interests").
21. See, e.g., Free World Foreign Cars v. Alfa Romeo, S.P.A., 55 F.R.D. 26, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(cost of defending class action threatened economic viability of defendant and therefore economic inter-
ests of one segment of class); Gerlach v. Allstate Ins. Co., 338 F. Supp. 642, 646 (S.D. Fla. 1972)
(plaintiff's damage action against insurance company could threaten economic viability and affect in-
terests of some class members who preferred coverage over damages).
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tence of commonality and typicality.22 Although in some cases conflicting
interests may be easily discerned from the pleadings, in other cases subtle
class differences may compel the court to extend its analysis beyond the
surface of the complaint.2 3 For example, in an employment discrimination
class suit, employees may differ strongly with respect to opportunities for
promotion or advancement, seniority rights, lay-off and call-back priori-
ties, access to training programs, dependency on the employer, and other
conditions of employment. The court's assessment of compliance with the
class prerequisites must be informed by consideration of absent member's
interests. Certification implies the absence of serious class conflicts and the
presence of a representative plaintiff who, acting on behalf of the class, is
capable of vindicating the legal claims they mutually share.
II. Current Certification Procedures
Effective exercise of the court's function in protecting absentees depends
upon a comprehensive overview of the class and its multiplicity of inter-
ests. 2 Currently, however, courts lack an effective means of obtaining in-
formation essential for a class ruling. The techniques now utilized con-
tribute to delays in litigation, impose heavy costs on plaintiffs, and
jeopardize the interests of absentees.
A. Inadequate Information
Because of the important consequences of class certification, a certifica-
22. Examples of the existence of conflicts among class members despite commonality and typical-
ity are provided by suits on behalf of a class of franchisees or land purchasers alleging antitrust
violations or fraud in a franchise or sales agreement. In the former, the commonality requirement is
met since the challenged practice is common to all franchisees. Similarly, typicality is satisfied since
the representatives' claim is the claim asserted by the class members. Conflict arises, however, in that
some plaintiffs may be seeking a rescission of their contract while others may prefer to maintain their
business relationship with the defendant and may be willing to settle for an award of damages. See
Lukenas v. Bryce's Mountain Resort, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 69, 71-72 (W.D. Va. 1975); Seligson v. Plum
Tree, 61 F.R.D. 343, 345-46 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
23. See King v. Gulf Oil Co., 581 F.2d 1184, 1186 (5th Cir. 1978) (propriety of class suits can
seldom be determined on basis of pleadings alone); International Woodworkers v. Georgia Pac. Corp.,
568 F.2d 64, 67 (8th Cir. 1977) (same); Cruz v. Estelle, 497 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1974) (same);
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, at 1785 (same). But see Pearlman v. Gennaro, 17 Fed. R. Serv.
2d 666, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (pleadings and affidavits contain sufficient information for court to
resolve certification issue).
24. See New York v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295, 298-300 (2nd Cir.
1969) (trial judge needs information sufficient to indicate actual problems in class); Folding Cartons v.
American Car Co., 79 F.R.D. 698, 700 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (court's role in class certification is to assure
that all data necessary for informed decision be laid before bench). The trial court considering the
certification decision should insure that it has obtained an adequate factual basis upon which to decide
whether class treatment is appropriate, "thereby dispelling frivolous or abusive suits at their inception,
and providing those with meritorious claims the forum to which they are entitled." Comment, 42
FORDHAM L. REV. 791, 795 (1974); see Developments-Class Actions, supra note 5, at 1475 (trial
judge must possess at least some information about characteristics of class to safeguard absentees'
interests).
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tion decision should be made as promptly as possible." Class certification
significantly affects not only the litigation posture of the named plaintiff,2 '
but also the rights of absent class members. Once a class is certified, ab-
sent members may have a variety of rights, including a right to notice of
the action, 27 to request exclusion,2 to notice of a proposed settlement or
25. Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1980), describes the problem
encountered by courts making a certification ruling at the start of litigation:
The resulting difficulty of making a fair determination of class action status in advance of trial
on the merits produces a dilemma for trial courts that is well known and for which no happy
general solution has yet been, or is likely to be found. On the one hand-for perfectly good
and obvious reasons-Rule 23(c)(1) admonishes that the class action determination shall be
made 'as soon as practicable.' On the other hand-for equally good and obvious reasons-trial
courts have been cautioned not to act too precipitately, on insufficient records, in making the
determination.
Id. at 275.
26. The litigational posture of the named plaintiff is usually enhanced significantly once a class is
certified since it increases bargaining power as a result of the increased potential liability imposed
upon the defendant. The underlying nature of the class, however, dictates whether this advantage
must be balanced against the potential costs of certification. In actions seeking primarily declaratory or
injunctive relief, the absence of mandatory notice requirements makes the advantage relatively costless.
Where the class suit seeks primarily damages and is certified under 23(b)(3), however, Rule 23 (c)(1)
requires mandatory notice to each class member who can be identified through reasonable effort.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173 (1974) (individual notice to all members who can be
identified through reasonable effort required in (b)(3) suits. In certain cases the costs incurred in
complying with the notice requirement may be burdensome or even prohibitive. Efforts to frame a
more equitable regime whereby the defendant assumes some of the financial burden, see, e.g., Osta-
powicz v. Johnson Bronze, 54 F.R.D. 465, 467 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (cost of notice equally divided
between plaintiff and defendant), have been rejected by the Supreme Court. See Oppenheimer Fund
v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 356 (1978) (general rule is that representative plaintiff bears cost of notice);
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974) (plaintiff must initially bear the cost of
notice). In Oppenheimer, however, the Court did not absolutely foreclose cost-allocation. It recognized
instances where the cost may be so insubstantial to the defendant that shifting it to the plaintiff is not
warranted. Oppenheimer, 437 U.S. at 358.
27. A function of the certification order is to specify the type of class action to be maintained.
Shipp v. Tennessee Dep't of Employment Sec., 25 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1435, 1438 (6th Cir. 1978)
(certification indicates whether action maintainable as a 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2) or 23(b)(3) class); Shane v.
Northwest Indus., 49 F.R.D. 46, 47 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (interests of class members can be fully pro-
tected only once class is certified and type of action determined).
Once a class is certified as a 23(b)(3) action, individual notice to the absent class members is
mandatory.
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to the members
of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to
all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.
FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(2). See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173 (1974) (notice
mandatory in Rule 23(b)(3) action); In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 552 F. 2d 1088,
1097 (5th Cir. 1977) (once class certified as (b)(3) action notice to each identifiable class member
required). The earlier the class is certified, the earlier notice can be sent to absent class members who
can then seek to protect their interests. See In re Home Stake Production Company Securities Litiga-
tion, 76 F.R.D. 351, 380 (N.D. Okla. 1977) (notice must be distributed to all class members at
earliest possible time); Buchholtz v. Swift & Co., 62 F.R.D. 581, 588 (D. Minn. 1973) (same).
Rule 23(d)(2) governs notice in actions certified under subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2). Although discre-
tionary on the part of the court, notice under these circumstances is important to apprise absent class
members of the action, to invite their participation in the suit, and to enable them to object to the
adequacy of representation. Oneida Indian Nation v. State, 85 F.R.D. 701, 707 n.9 (N.D.N.Y. 1980)
(court may fashion notice necessary to protect rights of absent class members in Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
action); Arey v. Providence Hosp., 55 F.R.D. 62, 71 (D.D.C. 1972) (due process may require notice
in Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2) actions). The earlier notice is received, the more meaningful is the
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dismissal,29 and to participate in the action or to object to the adequacy of
representation. These rights can be fully protected only if the certifiction
decision is made during the early stages of litigation.
At the commencement of litigation, however, the primary sources of
class information are the named plaintiffis complaint and supporting affi-
davits, which are usually framed in broad and conclusory language31 and
opportunity for class members to protect their interests.
Since certification dictates the type of notice the class is entitled to receive, the decision should be
rendered as early as practicable. As Judge Frankel has observed:
There is no occasion for any notice until after the propriety of the class action has been deter-
mined. . . [I]f notice is to be effective-if class members are to have a meaningful opportunity
to request exclusion, appear in the action, object to representation, etc.,-the invitation must go
out as promptly as the circumstances will permit.
Frankel, supra note 4, at 40-41.
28. In Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689, 697 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 920
(1976), the court indicated that in 23(b)(3) actions it is imperative that class members be identified
early enough to provide them with notice that may give them a meaningful opportunity to request
exclusion from the class. See also Sander v. John Nuveen, 463 F.2d 1075, 1082 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (purpose of mandatory notice is to advise all class members of rights and
privileges). Frankel, supra note 4, (meaningful opportunity to request exclusion contingent on early
certification).
29. Rule 23(e) requires that a proposed settlement or dismissal of a class action be approved by
the court and that notice be sent to the class in a manner prescribed by the court. The rule is designed
to protect absent class members: "[The] primary concern of the court under Rule 23(e) is to assure
that any person whose rights will be affected by a dismissal or compromise has the opportunity to
contest the proposed action." WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, 1797, at 234. Such protection is
generally not feasible prior to class certification since the class members have yet to be determined. J.
MOORE, supra note 15, at 23.80 [2.-1].
In their respective treatises, Moore and Wright & Miller contend that for rule 23(e) purposes an
action should be treated as a class action prior to class certification determination. J. MOORE, supra
note 15, at §20.50; 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, 1785, at 1797. While many courts have
adopted this approach, see, e.g, Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 169 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 950 (1970); American Fin. Sys. v. Pickerel, 18 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 292, 292 (D. Md. 1974) other
courts have indicated that Rule 23(e) is operative only after a class has been certified, see, e.g., Shelton
v. Pargo, Inc., 25 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1441, 1451 (4th Cir. 1978); Pan Am. World Airways v. United
States Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 523 F.2d 1073, 1079 (9th Cir. 1975); Wallican v. Waterloo
Community School Dist., 80 F.R.D. 492, 493-94 (N.D. Iowa 1978). Irrespective of the approach
adopted to deal with precertification settlement or dismissal, protection of absent class members during
this stage is greatest when the trial judge obtains a comprehensive overview of the class interests early
in the litigation. See generally Wheeler, Predisnaissal Notice and Statute of Limitations in Federal
Class Action After American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 48 S. CALIF. L. REV. 771 (1975)
(pre-dismissal, pre-certification notice should be required upon showing of substantial likelihood of
detrimental reliance).
30. In Souza v. Scalone, 563 F.2d 385, 386 (9th Cir. 1977), the court indicated that although
notice is not mandatory in a suit certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2), notice may be re-
quired to provide class members an opportunity to signify whether representation is fair and ade-
quate, to intervene to present additional claims, or to otherwise come into the action, to submit views
as amicus curiae, for example. See also Chappelle v. E.I. duPont DeNemours & Co., 75 F.R.D. 74,
79 n.12 (E.D. Va. 1977) (notice to class certified important so each class member is on notice that he
will be bound by judgment and that he is entitled to intervene through counsel). Notice purporting to
invite intervention or monitoring of the adjudication is most effective if sent during the earliest stages
of litigation, when critical decisions are made and the contours of the suit are developed.
31. See Hyatt v. United Aircraft, 50 F.R.D. 242, 246 (D. Ct. 1970) (complaint couched in such
sweeping terms that it is impossible to determine compliance with class requirements); Note, The
Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action: An Empirical Study, 62 GEO. L.J. 1123, 1141 (1974) (empirical study
reveals description, size, and alleged damages of class are frequently only outlined generally).
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which are inadequate and unreliable sources of class certification informa-
tion. The typical complaint is only a schematic compilation of one party's
untested factual and legal allegations including unsupported allegations
that Rule 23 requirements have been fulfilled. The complaint may set out
a broadly defined plaintiff class as part of litigation strategy, 2 but more
likely it will do so because of the class attorney's lack of relevant informa-
tion. Even if the class attorney is fully cognizant of a multiplicity of inter-
ests within the proposed class, he may minimize or omit reference to ap-
parent conflicts33 in an effort to gain certification. Thus, unless the court
receives comprehensive and objective information relevant to the class ac-
tion prerequisites during the early stages of litigation, the kind of rigorous
analysis that would effectively protect absent class members is not
possible.
B. Judicial Response
Trial courts have used several methods in attempting to remedy the
information deficiencies in the certification process. These methods include
the following: conducting a preliminary evidentiary hearing on the mer-
its, 34 conducting a preliminary evidentiary hearing on the class issue,31
granting or denying certification conditionally,3 ' and rendering speculative
Doninger v. Pacific Northwest Bell, 564 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1977), illustrates the insufficiency of
some class complaints. Upon review of the plaintiffs' (appellants') papers, the court stated:
The appellants' complaint merely mimics the language of Rule 23 in a parallel fashion.
Moreover, only two affidavits were submitted . . . [and these] added little, if any, factual
support to the class allegations. . .. The memoranda of authority in support of appellants'
motions are likewise lacking in articulable facts, offering only vague and conclusory statements
with little specific content.
Id. at 1309.
32. A very broadly defined class may be deemed advantageous in actions primarily for injunctive
or declaratory relief, to enhance the scope of a decree and to facilitate its enforcement. See I H.
NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS 11410, at 498 (1977 & Supp. 1981).
33. See Developments-Class Actions, supra note 5, at 1440 (hazardous to rely on named plain-
tiffs for class facts that may reveal conflict of interest).
34. Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 664, 668 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (preliminary evidentiary hearing
on the merits necessary during certification process); Milberg v. Western Pacific R.R., 51 F.R.D. 280,
282 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), appeal dismissed, 443 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971) (certification contingent upon
showing substantial possibility of success on merits); cf Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689, 698
(7th Cir. 1975) (permissible to enter single order determining both merits and class certification issue
in (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions); Note, supra note 31, at 1144 (cases reiewed in study reveal courts tend
to consider merits along with class issue from outset of litigation).
Some commentators advocate the use of a preliminary hearing on the merits as part of the certifica-
tion process. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CONSUMER JUSTICE, REDRESS OF CONSUMER GRIEV-
ANCES 31 (1973).
35. See, e.g., Doctor v. Seaboard Coast Line Ry., 540 F.2d 699, 707 (4th Cir. 1976); Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, 417 F.2d 1122, 1124-25 (5th Cir. 1969).
36. See, e.g., Forbes v. Greater Minn. Bd. of Realtors, 61 F.R.D. 416, 417 (D. Minn. 1973)
(conditional certification order rendered because definition of class could be refined and revised when
more factual information available); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673,
683 (N.D. Ind. 1966) (class action status granted but made expressly provisional on satisfying specific
conditions).
Class Actions
determinations.3 7 All these methods, however, are inadequate ways to
achieve the goal of an early and informed class certification decision.
1. Preliminary Evidentiary Hearing on the Merits
At one time courts conditioned class certification on the merits of the
underlying action. 38 Some courts refused to certify a class unless the plain-
tiff demonstrated a reasonable probability of success on the merits. 9 In
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, however, the Supreme Court expressly re-
jected any approach that conditioned certification upon a preliminary ex-
amination of the merits." Such a procedure, the Court declared, subverts
the purpose of the class action rule by allowing a representative plaintiff
to secure the benefits of a class action without satisfying the rule's
requirements."
In determining the propriety of a class action, the question is not
whether the plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the
merits, but rather whether the Rule 23 prerequisites have been met.42
Though information necessary to resolve the class issue may also bear on
the merits in particular cases, 43 it is essential to maintain a clear distinc-
37. Doe v. Charleston Area Medical Center, 529 F.2d 638, 645 (4th Cir. 1975) (class definition
in suits for declaratory injunctive relief may be speculative). But see O'Brien v. Shimp, 356 F. Supp.
1259, 1266 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (class determination may not be based on mere speculation); McCoy v.
McLeroy, 348 F. Supp. 1034, 1038-39 (D. Ga. 1972) (same). See generally 7A WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 2, 11785, at 134 (class facts may be proved by presumptions).
38. This approach probably resulted from a confusion of the interrelationship between the certifi-
cation requirements and the merits of the class claim. Under Rule 23, determination of the propriety
of a class action is a strictly procedural matter, and not dependent upon whether a cause of action
exists. If the defendant seeks dismissal of the class claim on the ground that it is meritless, a Rule
12(b)(6) ("dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted") or Rule 56 ("sum-
mary judgment") motion is the proper vehicle. DuPont v. Woodlawn Trustees, 64 F.R.D. 16, 19 (D.
Del. 1974); Cusick v. Nederlandsche Indus. 317 F. Supp. 1022, 1024 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (contentions
relating to legal possibility of recovery properly made pursuant to Rule 56 or Rule 12(b)(6), not Rule
23(c)(1)). Early court cases that conditioned certification upon a preliminary showing of success on
the merits, see supra note 34, may have failed to distinguish between the procedural character of the
former and substantive nature of the latter.
39. See, e.g., Ray v. Rockefeller, 352 F. Supp. 750, 757 (N.D.N.Y. 1973) (possibility of success
important factor to be weighed in authorization of class action); Becker v. Schenley Indus., [1972-
1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 193, 669, at 92, 987 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (maintaining
class suit dependent upon plaintiffs' establishing "substantial possibility that they will prevail on the
merits"); Milberg v. Western Pac. R.R., 51 F.R.D. 280, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), appeal dismissed, 443
F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971) (before class action can proceed plaintiff must show substantial possibility of
success on merits).
40. 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974).
41. Id.
42. See Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34, 42 (5th Cir. 1974) (consideration of likelihood of success on
individual claim no more proper in determining membership in class than in determining adequacy of
representation); Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 74 F.R.D. 24, 37 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (class deter-
mination not dependent upon representative plaintiff having meritorious claim), afl'd in part, rev'd in
part, 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980); 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 32, §2120, at 610 (resolution of
commonality, typicality,and adequacy of representation doesn't depend on substantive resolution of
disputed facts but rather on appraisal of attendant facts and circumstances of action in procedural
framework).
43. See Huff v. N.D. Cases Co., 485 F.2d 710, 714 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc) (inescapable over-
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tion between the two types of inquiries. The due process concern for safe-
guarding the absentees' day in court is procedural and separable from the
substantive issues. Regardless of whether or not the class proponent can
succeed on the merits of the claim, he may have established the Rule 23
requirements for maintenance of a class action.""
2. Preliminary Evidentiary Hearing on the Class Issue
A second judicial response to the information problem is to conduct a
preliminary evidentiary hearing on the class issue." At such a hearing, the
participants typically will be the representative party, the defendants, and
the trial judge. There is no requirement of notice to class members during
this stage of litigation,4 and it is thus improbable that evidence of a con-
flict between the representative and prospective class members will be
forthcoming. By itself, a preliminary hearing on class certification will not
provide the trial judge with information that is contrary to the interests of
the class representatives.
While it may be in the defendant's interest, at times, to allege class
conflicts, it is inappropriate to rely upon the defendant to safeguard the
interests of the absent class members. The defendant may be unaware of
many potential conflicts within the proposed class. Even if the defendant
is aware of such conflicts, it may be in his interest to conceal them and to
seek the broader res judicata effect that will result if he is successful on
the merits.'7
Aside from these incentive problems, an evidentiary hearing does not in
itself give the parties greater access to relevant class information. In an
attempt to alleviate this problem, many courts have permitted discovery of
absent class members prior to the class hearing.4' This solution, however,
lap in some cases between Rule 23 prerequisites, and question of whether plaintiff can succeed on
merits); Shaw v. Mobil Oil Co., 60 F.R.D. 566, 568 (D.N.H. 1973) (informed resolution of class
issue may necessitate inquiry into the merits).
44. Francis v. Allied Serv. Co., 486 F.2d 597, 598-99 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (plaintiff with
predictably losing claim may meet class action prerequisites).
45. See, e.g, Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090, 1098 (5th Cir. 1975); supra note 35.
46. See supra note 27.
47. If the defendant believes the action has little merit, he has a strong incentive to seek a class
judgment that binds the broadest class possible. 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 32, at 11010.3c. In certain
cases, however the benefits of res judicata may be outweighed by the increased danger of large liability
if the defendant loses on the merits; in such cases, the defendant will have an incentive to identify
conflicts within the class in the hope that the size of the class will be reduced. Even then, it remains
hazardous to rely upon defendants to identify class conflicts, because such assistance depends upon
defendants' subjective determination of the probability of success on the merits.
48. In general, courts have taken a cautious approach to discovery directed to absent class mem-
bers. Several courts have permitted such discovery but indicated that it should be utilized only under
special circumstances. See, e.g., Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999, 1004-05
(7th Cir. 1971) (absent class members may be required to submit to discovery where information is
necessary and precautionary measures taken); Enterprise Wall Paper Mfg. v. Bodman, 85 F.R.D.
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creates difficulties that may outweigh its benefits. As in the case of a hear-
ing, it is hazardous to rely upon the representative plaintiffs to develop
class information contrary to their interests. 9 Furthermore, while the
equal availability of discovery to the defendant may impede such conceal-
ment, it also provides the defendant with the means to abuse or intimidate
class members and to create delays.5 0 Even without such abuse, precertifi-
cation discovery exacerbates the problem of sprawling, extraordinarily
protracted and costly class litigation. Any alteration of the current process
should be consistent with the policy of efficiency and effectiveness that is
the underlying rationale of the class action device,"1 and should not con-
tribute to the enormous delay associated with representative adjudication.
Finally, discovery rights pertaining to the class issue may increase the
number of strike suits brought by plaintiffs to harass or threaten defen-
dants. The class action device may be greatly abused if the mere filing of a
class complaint provides the plaintiff with class-wide discovery rights.12
Representative suits may then be commenced only upon the hope that
colorable class claims will be disclosed during discovery.
3. Conditional and Speculative Determination
Two other techniques are employed by trial judges to remedy the infor-
mation deficiency. One method is to render a conditional decision on the
325, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (strong showing of need for absentee information required before discovery
of absent class members is compelled); United States v. Trucking Employers, 72 F.R.D. 101, 104-05
(D.D.C. 1976) (reasonable discovery of absent class members permissible where necessary informa-
tion can be obtained only from absent class members). Other courts refuse to permit discovery of
absent class members. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532, 534 (N.D. Ga. 1972)
(discovery of absent class members improper); Fischer v. Wolfinbanger, 55 F.R.D. 129, 132 (W.D.
Ky. 1971) (same). See generally Note, Civil Procedure: Absentee Class Members Subjected To Dis-
covery And Claims Dismissed For Failure to Respond, 1971 DUKE L.J. 1007, 1014 (proposition that
class members may be subject to discovery diverges from traditional concept of class action).
49. See, e.g., Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 904 (2d Cir. 1972) (reversing settlement approved
by district court because discovery was inadequate); Developments-Class Actions, supra note 5, at
1441 (private control of discovery may be inadequate to provide requisite class information). This
limitation of the discovery device is clearly illustrated in Weiss v. Chalker, 55 F.R.D. 168, 169
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). The court postponed approval of the settlement proposal because the scope of dis-
covery was inadequate for an intelligent assessment of the fairness of the settlement to absent class
members.
50. See Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 231, 236 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (discovery of class members may
be used to take advantage of class members or strategem to reduce number of claimants); Gardner v.
Awards Mktg. Corp., 55 F.R.D. 460, 463-66 (D. Utah 1972) (defendant discovery of class members
denied because it would impose substantial burden); Developments-Class Actions, supra note 5, at
1440 (defendant discovery of absentees must be limited to prevent abuse).
51. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee note, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 98, 102 (1966)
(policy underlying class action rule is to achieve economies of time and effort).
52. The class action device has been characterized as permitting "legalized blackmail," and often
is criticized because of its potential for abuse. See generally Handler, The Shift from Substantive to
Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM.
L. RE V. 1, 6-12 (1971); Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375,
375 (1972).
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class issue until more information is available.5 3 A similar technique is to
make a speculative determination, 4 premised upon unsupported and un-
proven assumptions of compliance with the class action requirements.
Each option is potentially prejudicial to either the absentees or the de-
fendants, and increases the chances of abuse of the class action device. The
use of either technique may indicate uncertainty over whether the class
representative can adequately represent the interests of the class mem-
bers."5 Both provide minimal protection for absentees' interests, especially
during settlement negotiations that precede the certification decision. Dur-
ing these negotiations the class representative must necessarily compro-
mise certain interests. 6 Since there has been no judicial finding as to the
adequacy of representation and no clear definition of the class, the plain-
tiff may be more likely to misrepresent or underrepresent class members'
claims."
53. To the extent any certification order is subject to modification in light of new information or
changed circumstances, it is a "conditional" order. An order "conditional" in this sense must be distin-
guished from an explicitly conditional certification order. In the case of the former, the trial court has
usually assessed the class facts and concluded that the class prerequisites have been met. See, e.g.,
Zenith Laboratories v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 530 F.2d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1976) (certification always
subject to amendment or decertification); Taylor v. Safeway Stores, 524 F.2d 263, 269 (10th Cir.
1975) (same). In the case of the latter, the court believes the prerequisites have not been met but
grants class status nonetheless, which is made expressly conditional upon subsequent compliance with
the requirements. See, e.g., Basch v. Talley Indus., 53 F.R.D. 14, 20-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (certifica-
tion conditioned upon later compliance with prerequisites of fair and adequate representation); Gers-
tie v. Continental Airlines, 50 F.R.D. 213, 216 (D. Colo. 1970) (same). But cf. Green v. Wolf Corp.,
406 F.2d 291, 295 n.6 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969) (conditional denial of certifi-
cation criticized because results in inability to continue litigation). The primary purpose of explicit
conditional certification is to permit a suit to be maintained as a class action when the court has
insufficient information to render a "final" certification order, in the hope that new information will
be forthcoming.
54. See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 901 n.17 (9th Cir. 1975) (court forced to speculate by
uncertain state of record at time of ruling on motion for certification), 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 32,
12085, at 587-88 (due to early certification requirement and information deficiency courts resort to
presumption of entitlement to maintain class actions).
55. The need to resort to a conditional certification is usually a result of the absence of a full
factual foundation on which to render a class decision. This lack of class information precludes an
appraisal of compliance with the class prerequisites, necessary to protect class members' interests. The
overall nature and quality of the representation proffered by the named plaintiff is indeterminate, and
possibly inadequate and prejudicial to the rights of class members since certification requirements
have not been met. See supra pp. 592-97. Rendering a conditional or speculative certification fails to
meet the standard described in Clark v. South Central Bell Telephone, 419 F. Supp. 697, 701 (W.D.
La. 1976):
"The class action certification procedure of Rule 23(c) imposes a stringent duty on the court to
protect the interests of absent class members. . . . The court carefully must scrutinize the
representation of the class members at every turn as a trustee for the absent putative class
members."
56. See Developments-Class Actions, supra note 5, at 1537 (during private negotiations of class
action issues class attorney must forego some relief beneficial to some class members to avoid need for
trial).
57. See Developments-Class Actions, supra note 5, at 1553 (conflicts of interest between named
plaintiff and class members frequently arise in context of settlement negotiations). When both parties
support dismissal, the lack of adversary proceedings may deprive the trial judge of information perti-
nent to the certification decision. See Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494, 500-01 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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Ostensibly, any settlement reached between the parties must be ex-
pressly approved by the court as consistent with the interests of the absent
class members.58 Either a conditional or a speculative decision indicates,
however, that the class representative has failed to provide, and the court
lacks, the information necessary to comprehend fully the interests of the
class. Without that information, the court's approval of a compromise can-
not provide adequate protection of the class interests.
The defendant also is placed in a precarious position when the oppos-
ing class is certified on the basis of inadequate information. Certification
of the class gives the plaintiff a substantial strategic advantage in negotia-
tions regardless of whether compliance with class prerequisites is demon-
strated. 9 Therefore, conditional or speculative class determination in-
creases the potential for abuse of the class action as a strike suit.
III. A Proposal for Attorney Solicitation to Facilitate Class Certification
To minimize inappropriate use of the class action device, the trial judge
should reach a fully informed determination on class certification at the
outset of litigation. 0 That class attorneys, and therefore the court, lack the
information about potential class members necessary to make such a de-
termination6 1 is largely attributable to the absence of a timely and reliable
procedure for obtaining the necessary information about the class. Ethical
rules restricting attorney solicitation further impeded the flow of informa-
58. "A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and
notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such
manner as the court directs." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c). See Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir.
1975) (court has independent duty to protect interests of class members in settlements); Grunin v.
International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975)
(trial court's role as fiduciary of absentee interests is particularly crucial during settlement stage);
American Fin. Sys. v. Pickerel, 19 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 491, 492 (D. Md. 1974) (trial judge may dissolve
or redefine class, or both, to protect rights of all absent members).
59. See Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1967)
("[N]o litigant should be permitted to enhance his own bargaining power by merely alleging that he is
acting for a class of litigants.")
60. See supra pp. 595-97 (prompt certification increases protection of absent class members); 1 H.
NEWBERG, supra note 32, 2085, at 587-88 (Rule 23(c) contemplates prompt ruling by court-often
at pleading stage). Some courts have adopted local rules governing the timing of motions for class
certification, see, e.g., Sanders v. Lum's Inc., 76 F.R.D. 1, 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (local rule requiring
certification motion within sixty days), and others have found noncompliance with such rules a factor
relevant in resolving the adequacy of representation issue, see, e.g., East Tex. Motor Freight v. Rodri-
quez, 431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977) (delay in moving for class certification may be indicative of inade-
quate representation); Burns v. Georgia, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1566, 1568 (N.D. Ga.
1977) (noncompliance with local rule factor in denial of class certification). But see Marquez v. Kiley,
436 F. Supp. 100, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (plaintiffs failure to move for certification as required by
local rule may not be sufficient ground to deny class status).
61. The class attorney has three primary responsibilities: to discover the range of interests within
the proposed class; to report conflicts of interest detected among class members; and to indicate which
groups will be inadequately represented. See Developments-Class Actions, supra note 5, at 1592-95.
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tion.6 2 Relaxing such proscriptions in the context of attorney-initiated
communication with potential class members would help generate class
information that could facilitate an early certification decision. Any ethical
objections to attorney-initiated class communication can be satisfied by ap-
propriate regulations. 3 Such regulations could also ensure that the infor-
mation collected through solicitation is made available to the trial judge
for the class certification decision.
A. The Case for Solicitation
The class action rule provides no procedure for obtaining information
relevant to whether a representative suit is appropriate or, if so, how the
class should be defined." The only current, direct response to this short-
coming-the authorization by some courts of ordinary discovery of absent
class members-invites abuse and delay, and is ultimately ineffective."5
Moreover, discovery of class information necessarily occurs after the class
complaint has been filed and the proposed class defined, even though the
most propitious time for obtaining such information is prior to the filing
of a formal complaint, when the class attorney must determine whether a
class action is appropriate and attempt to define the contours of the class.
Permitting attorneys to solicit class information enhances the represen-
62. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly discourages attorney solicitation of
clients. One provision of the Code provides that:
A lawyer should not initiate an in-person contact with a non-client, personally or through a
representative, for the purpose of being retained to represent him for compensation.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-3 (1979). A similar provision states that:
A lawyer who volunteers in-person advice that one should obtain the services of a lawyer
generally should not himself accept employment compensation, or other benefit in connection
with the matter.
Id. at EC 2-4.
The Code does, however, make a limited exception to these rules:
If success in asserting rights or defenses of his client in litigation in the nature of a class action
is dependent upon the joinder of others, a lawyer may accept, but shall not seek, employment
from those contacted for the purpose of obtaining their joinder.
Id. at DR 2-104(A)(5).
The effect of these restrictions on precomplaint attorney-initiated communication with potential
class members is unclear. Is a potential class member in a prospective class action a "non-client"
within the meaning of EC 2-3? If a class attorney, who is representing a named plaintiff, communi-
cates with a potential class member and decides the latter is a more adequate representative of the
class, is substitution of the member for the original named plaintiff prohibited by EC 2-4 or DR 2-
104(5)? These uncertainties may discourage pre-complaint attorney communication with potential
class members for purposes of ascertaining whether a class exists, because such communication may
be indistinguisable from solicitation of potential clients.
63. See infra pp. 608-11.
64. The broad discretionary authority granted the court under Rule 23 to frame orders for the
protection of absent class members may obviate the adoption of any specific procedure for collecting
class information prior to certification. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d). Acknowledging, however, the protective
function of certification, one may argue that a more precise procedure can reduce the uncertainty and
perfunctory nature of many certification decisions. See supra notes 53-55, 58.
65. See supra notes 48-50.
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tative plaintiff's litigation posture, prevents abuse of the class action device
against defendants, and allows the trial court to protect absentees effec-
tively, making class adjudication more effective and equitable. With
greater precomplaint information about the potential class, the attorney
would be in a better position to determine whether class adjudication is
warranted. This would preclude many lawsuits, brought as class actions
due to lack of attorney information, in which no class exists and which
ultimately are denied certification. Consequently, any increase in class
suits resulting from relaxing restrictions on lawyer initiated class contact
will be offset by the likely reduction in unmeritorious class allegations.
Where the information suggests that a class suit is appropriate, the attor-
ney should be able to provide a clear and precise definition of the class,
thus replacing unsupported allegations and conclusory assertions with
well-founded and relatively accurate statements of compliance with class
requirements. This should allow an early certification decision without
recourse to preliminary hearings and discovery. Finally, through solicita-
tion the class attorney may learn of substantive violations not initially ap-
parent. This information may provide further support for the original
claim or give rise to new claims. 6
Equipped with a comprehensive understanding of the class claim, class
counsel's litigation position is substantialy strengthened without impairing
the rights of defendants. The primary advantage to the class defendant
will be a decrease in the number of frivolous class suits filed to harass
defendants and to induce unfair settlements.67 Abuse of the class action as
66. A potential objection to claims solicited in this fashion is that the result is indistinguishable
from solicitation of the original named plaintiff, and therefore in direct contravention of the current
antisolicitation rules. See supra note 62. Concededly, solicitation of the original named plaintiff is
conceivable under the proposed scheme. Several considerations indicate, however, that this form of
solicitation can be minimized, and where such solicitation does occur, the harmful effects with which
it is associated can be effectively negated. See, e.g., Comment, A Critical Analysis of Rules Against
Solicitation By Lawyers, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 674, 675-84 (1958) (critical analysis of alleged harms
associated with attorney solicitation); Note, The Profession's Duty, infra note 77, at 1184. Under the
proposed regulations, the class attorney is required to file an affidavit that identifies the original
named plaintiff, provides a general description of the claim, and indicates the intent to solicit informa-
tion. See infra p. 611. Solicitation of legal representation is objectionable only when accompanied by
misrepresentation, underrepresentation, overreaching, or fraud. If solicitation of the named plaintiff
occurs in spite of the regulations, the certification process, coupled with the class information made
available to the court under the proposal, should enable the trial judge to ascertain whether such a
violation exists and to deal with it accordingly.
67. See Handler, supra note 52, at 9. Professor Handler underscores the "in terrorem" effect
caused by utilization of the class procedure. The "blackmail effect" of the increased pressure to settle
(IP) caused by the existence of the class rule is described as the difference between the expected cost of
losing the class action (Ec) and the expected cpst of losing all the individual suits that would be
brought in the absence of a class action rule (E). Symbolically this is represented:
IP Ec E1 = Ls (P P. (Cc - C)) where:
L - probability that the defendant will lose the suit on the merits if it goes to trial;
S = average size of each named plaintiff's or class member's claim;
P1 number of named plaintiffs in the class action who would not file individual suits in the
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a blackmail device will become increasingly difficult if the trial judge has
the means to scrutinize rigorously the class that is purportedly repre-
sented. Solicited information will facilitate detection of frivolous suits at
an early stage of litigation, thus affording additional protection against
early settlement pressures. Admittedly, no advantage accrues to defendants
from the possible increase in the number of class suits or the liability
resulting from such suits. Any advantage derived from the ignorance or
lack of legal sophistication of potential litigants, however, is clearly unde-
served. Where a substantive violation exists, redress of legal grievances
should be the paramount goal of a legal system.
Once a complaint is filed, some courts explicitly restrict communication
between the class representative and actual or potential class members,
thus exacerbating the difficulty of obtaining class information. 8 Courts
justify "gag orders" or local rules that restrict attorney-class communica-
tion as essential to prevent specifically forbidden communication such as
solicitation of legal representation of class members, 9 solicitation of fees
and expenses, and misleading communication."
absence of a class action rule;
P, = number of class members in the class action who would not file individual suits in the
absence of a class action rule;
Cc = cost to the defendant of defending the class suit;
C1 = cost to the defendant of defending all of the individual actions that would be brought in
the absence of a class action rule.
Schoor, infra note 77, at 239 n.82.
68. See, e.g., Oswald v. General Motors Corp., 594 F.2d 1106, 1138 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 870 (1979) (restrictive communication order imposed and declared valid); Gouldman v. Seligman
& Latz of Houston, 82 F.R.D. 727, 728-29 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (same). But see Bernard v. Gulf Oil
Co., 49 U.S.L.W. 4604 (1981) (gag order improper unless narrowly drawn and based on dear record
and specific findings). See generally Comment, Judicial Screening of Class Action Communications,
55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 671 (1980) (court orders and local rules restricting class action communication
unconstitutional).
The Manual for Complex Litigation, an important handbook for class action lawyers, contains
widely adopted recommendations that district courts prohibit, either by local rule or pretrial order, all
unapproved communications of the class attorney with actual and potential class members. See 1
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (2d
ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as MANUAL]. The Manual also urges the prohibition of communication
initiated by the representative party. Id. § 1.41, at 32. Since the trial judge has jurisdiction of an
action only after the complaint is filed, such restrictions may not be imposed prior to the complaint.
Before formally filing a complaint, however, class attorneys are restricted in their communications
with potential class members by the professional rules of ethical conduct.
69. Precomplaint solicitation of persons to become class representatives, see, e.g., Simon v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 16 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1021, 1022 (N.D. Tex. 1972), afl'd on other
grounds, 482 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1973) (class suit dismissed where result of successful search for
person to act as named representative), is proscribed by the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY AND CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS DR-104(A)(5) & EC 2-3 (1979). See supra note 62.
After the suit is filed, attorney-initiated communication with class members to solicit legal representa-
tion in other matters, see, e.g., Korn v. Franchard Corp., 1970 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,845, at
90,169 (S.D.N.Y.) (class attorney unethically sent letter to all class members soliciting their participa-
tion in entirely different suit), may be restricted by court orders or local rules. See supra note 68.
70. See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litigation, 594 F.2d 1106, 1138
n.57 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979); Gouldman v. Seligman & Latz, 82 F.R.D. 727,
Class Actions
In the class action context, where the attorney must investigate the na-
ture and composition of the class to obtain a positive ruling on certifica-
tion, the court should encourage, not hinder, attorney communication with
potential class members. This communication would provide the class
counsel with more information about the nature of the class suit. It would
also enable the trial judge to make a more informed certification decision,
because the information the trial judge needs to decide the class issue is
precisely the type of information the class attorney could secure through
communication with class members.7 ' In particular, the class attorney
could solicit information sufficient to reveal any fundamental antagonisms
or conflicts of interests among class members, or between the representa-
tive plaintiff and the class. The information sought by the attorney to
obtain a positive certification decision could also be made available to the
court, thereby enabling it to make informed decisions regarding protective
procedural devices such as subclassing and intervention. 2
In the class action context the trial judge is under a special obligation to
safeguard the interests of the absent class members against anything that
might impair their interests. 7" Equipped with greater information about
the class whose claims are to be adjudicated, the court can more effectively
discharge its obligation. Upon motion for certification, the court can care-
fully analyze the proposed class on the basis of solicited information to
determine whether certification is appropriate, whether redefinition of the
class must precede certification, or whether denial is essential to protect
absent class members. Moreover, since the information will usually be
available when the class complaint is filed, the trial judge will be able to
monitor the interests of the proposed class during the early stages of any
728 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (local rule intended to prevent abuses of class action); Waldo v. Lakeshore
Estates, 433 F. Supp. 782, 786-89 (E.D. La. 1977), appeal dismissed, 529 F.2d 642 (1978) (local rule
designed to eliminate abuse of class action through solicitation and misrepresentation); Zarate v.
Younglove, 86 F.R.D. 80 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (danger of misrepresentation and unfair pressure inherent
in unsupervised communications during class suits). See generally MANUAL, supra note 68, § 1.41, at
225; Wilson, Control of Class Action Abuses Through Regulation of Communications, 4 Class Action
Rpts. 632, 634 (1975) (proposes more narrowly drawn rules restricting class communication to mini-
mize conflict with First Amendment rights of court access).
71. Permitting precomplaint communication will increase the class attorney's incentive to procure
class information. Until the complaint is filed, the attorney is not bound by any specific class definition
and, logically, should desire to obtain as much information about the prospective class as possible in
order to avoid subsequent challenges to the proposed class from either the defendant or the court
during the certification process. This contrasts markedly with post-complaint information gathering
techniques currently used. Despite the possibility of amending the complaint after it is filed, the attor-
ney may attempt only to substantiate allegations in the pleadings, and direct his efforts to this pur-
pose. Of course, if the attorney demonstrates an unwillingness to procure class information, the court
may always demand such information or deny class status to the proposed class. However, under the
current procedures courts rarely demand further class information. See supra note 54.
72. See supra notes 8-11.
73. See supra pp. 591-92.
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settlement negotiations. Approval or denial of a proposed settlement will
be premised upon a well-informed analysis of the interests at stake.
Furthermore, the necessary information may be obtained without
resorting to the questionable practices currently employed. While these
techniques-preliminary class hearings, speculative determinations, and
conditional certifications-may at times be effective, they pose serious
threats to the interests of both defendants and class members.14 Because
solicitation will usually occur prior to the filing of the class complaint, it is
also superior to allowing discovery aimed at absent class members. Unlike
postcomplaint discovery, it could not be exploited by a class defendant at
the expense of the absent class members" or by a plaintiff attempting to
turn the class action device into a strike suit.7 Finally, by obviating the
delay and expense associated with postcomplaint discovery devices and
other current procedures to obtain class information, the court will con-
serve scarce judicial resources without compromising its special obligation
to protect absent class members.
B. A Proposed Scheme for Regulated Solicitation
The present restrictions against attorney-class communication can be
relaxed substantially under a regulated procedure that minimizes any po-
tential for abuse." Attorney communication with potential class members
74. See supra p. 602.
75. See supra p. 601.
76. See supra notes 52 & 67.
77. The primary "abuse" envisioned is that lawyer-initiated communication with potential class
members may lead class attorneys to solicit legal representation of the class members. See supra note
62. In the class action context this would constitute proscribed solicitation of the original representa-
tive plaintiff. A recent Supreme Court case, however, indicated that attorney solicitation of clients may
not be prohibited under certain circumstances. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978). In Primus, an
attorney, who was also a cooperating lawyer with a branch of the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU), provided a group of women with information regarding their legal rights resulting from
their having been sterilized as a condition of receiving public medical assistance. The attorney subse-
quently informed one of the women, by means of a letter, that free legal assistance was available from
the ACLU. The South Carolina Supreme Court determined that the attorney had solicited a client,
and issued a public reprimand. The Supreme Court reversed underscoring the fact that the solicitation
was on behalf of "nonprofit organizations" engaged in litigation as a "form of political expression"
and "political association," and therefore that such solicitation was expressive and associational con-
duct entitled to First Amendment protection. Id. at 422-25. Examination of the record established that
none of the dangers associated with solicitation, such as undue influence, overreaching, misrepresenta-
tion, invasion of privacy and conflict of interest, were present.
The Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association has
ruled that a lawyer, who was the director of a legal services program, could seek out and advise
members of a certified class who had not been notified of their inclusion in the class or of their legal
rights. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1439 (1979). The Com-
mittee based its conclusion, in part, on the reasoning of In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978). The
Committee opinion, however, does not address the more difficult issue of attorney communication with
potential members of a class that has not been certified by the court or defined in a class complaint.
The scope of Primus, which appears to sanction precomplaint solicitation, is extremely limited since it
is premised on existence of a nonprofit organization that engaged in litigation as "a form of political
Class Actions
should be freely permitted subject to compliance with three requirements:
first, solicitation should be conducted so that the information generated
can be used by the court to verify subsequent class allegations; second, the
class attorney should elicit information relevant to the proposed class ac-
tion without suggesting the desired factual paradigm; and third, the infor-
mation generated should be filed with the clerk of the court or some other
"retention center. 7 8
Compliance with the verification requirement can be achieved if solici-
tation of class information is undertaken in written form. 9 It is essential
that the information generated through solicitation be retained so that the
court can verify the allegations made by the representative plaintiff in the
subsequent class certification proceeding.
Solicitation should be an open-ended inquiry requesting the respondent
to describe his factual situation if appropriate. The solicitation form
should include information sufficient to put the solicitee on notice as to the
type of response that will be relevant, but should not be leading or sugges-
tive of any specific factual paradigm, which might induce a response solely
expression" and "political association" entitled to First Amendment protection.
Several commentators have recommended easing the restrictions against attorney-class communica-
tion. See generally Schoor, Class Actions: The Right to Solicit, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 215 (1976)
(restrictions against attorney solicitation should be abolished in class action context where existing
judicial procedures may be modified to curb actual or potential misconduct); Note, Lawyer Solicita-
tion: The Effect of Ohralik and Primus, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 960 (1976) (advocating adoption of
less restrictive solicitation policy); Note, Advertising, Solicitation and the Profession's Duty to Make
Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181 (1972) (bar association prohibitions upon advertising
and solicitation constitute indefensible curtailment of essential information in violation of First
Amendment) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Profession's Duty].
78. Filing information with a specific court clerk should not preclude filing a class complaint in
another court. Otherwise there might be a disincentive to solicit information since many tactical con-
siderations affect forum selection.
79. Solicitation of information would, in many instances, be by means of correspondence with
potential class members. This, however, presupposes attorney knowledge of the exact whereabouts of
the absentees; if such knowledge is lacking the utility of the solicitation scheme may be restricted. This
restrictive effect may be minimized by attorney solicitation in the form of advertising. See, e.g., Zarate
v. Younglove, 86 F.R.D. 80 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
In Zarate a suit was brought to challenge alleged discrimination against Hispanics in employment
and promotion. The class attorney published the following advertisement in English and Spanish
newspapers:
Attention All Hispanics If you have been an applicant for employment or promotion for the
County of Riverside since 1975 and have received an interview and not hired, a rejection
notice, or no response, you are a potential recipient of back pay because of discriminatory
employment practices.
Id. at 85. If a respondent provided information indicating the possibility of discrimination a follow-up
letter was sent, seeking further information and suggesting an interview.
The District Court imposed a strict standard by which to evaluate such communication: The situa-
tion had to pose a "serious and imminent threat to the fair administration of justice." Id. at 106. In
rejecting the imposition of an order restricting attorney-class communication, the court relied, in part,
on the written nature of the communication: "[T]he absence of in-person solicitation here reduces, if
not eliminates, the likelihood of these evils ensuing, and the court's powers to set the attorney's fee,
and to monitor the quality of representation . . . further reduce any risk of harm from solicitation."
Id. at 99.
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because it may prove beneficial to the respondent. 0 Admittedly, there is a
tenuous line between providing information sufficient to elicit an accurate
and appropriate response and providing information that induces misrep-
resentation or untruthful acquiescence. This problem is inherent in any
communication directed to class members81 and demands careful drafting
of the solicitation form. Attorney abuses of the solicitation process may be
checked, however, by subsequent judicial review of the solicitation form
during the certification process."
Not every solicitation form will be returned with the relevant informa-
tion. A one hundred percent response rate is not necessary, however, to
disclose potential antagonisms or conflicts within the proposed class.83
Those solicitees who feel that the information provided relates to them in
some way will have an incentive to respond. Where a cause of action actu-
ally exists, the solicitee will be motivated by the desire to have his griev-
ances heard and redressed. In other cases, civic duty alone may provide
sufficient incentive to elicit a response."'
80. A solicitation form capable of generating the relevant information without suggesting the "cor-
rect" answer might read as follows:
Dear
An Employee of the company, employed in Plant x, contemplates initiating
legal proceedings against said employer alleging employment discrimination on the basis of
race. Uncertainty exists as to whether the alleged discrimination constitutes a single, isolated
incident or whether there exist other such cases. If you have any concrete, factual basis for
believing that you may be affected by this action or believe that you may be a victim of dis-
crimination please state such facts; if not, please disregard this notice. If you feel you have
factual support for an affirmative answer, please provide as much information as you feel is
relevant. (Include position, seniority, etc.).
81. Postcomplaint authorization of notice to class members gives rise to analogous problems. If the
notice contains too much information, it may become incomprehensible or seem threatening to class
members, thereby encouraging them to take the path of least resistance and opt out; if it contains too
little information, it will not fully inform absentees and may render meaningless their rights to opt out
or to contest adequacy of representation. Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58
F.R.D. 313, 327 (1973).
82. See supra p. 607.
83. The solicitation letter itself need not be sent to all members of the proposed class. Important
factors in the number of solicitation letters required include the size of the class and the attorney's
ability to locate potential ciass members. See supra note 79. In cases where the class is unmanageably
large, random mailings should be sufficient to serve the information-gathering purpose of the propo-
sal. Even in cases where mandatory posteertification notice to class members is ordered, the plaintiff
need not notify every class member. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (Rule
23(c)(2) requires individual notice to class members identifiable through "reasonable" effort); Spector
v. City of New York, 71 F.R.D. 550, 551-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Rule 23 requires only "best notice
practicable under the circumstances").
84. Complex motivational and psychological factors preclude accurate forecasting of response rates
to the solicitation forms. Advanced mail questionnaire techniques, however, have raised average re-
sponse rates to more than 70%. Goudy, Interim Responses to Mail Questionnaire: Impacts on Varia-
ble Relationships, 19 SOC. Q. 253, 254 (1978). In any given case, the interrelationship of innumerable
variables will be determinative of the response rate. Mc~rohan, A Cost/Benefit Approach to Postage
Used on Mail Questionnaires, 45 J. OF MARKETING 130-33 (1981) (business reply envelope improves
response rate). Optimal operation of the proposed solicitation scheme depends upon a relatively high
response rate from those that will be affected by the adjudication. According to one study, this is
precisely the group found to have a relatively high response rate. See Rudd, Mail Survey Response
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The soliciting attorney should be required to file the information gener-
ated from solicitation with a court clerk, a local bar association, or some
other "retention center." To ensure the acquisition of information both
beneficial and prejudicial to the managing parties, the information should
be transferred to the retention center prior to any form of screening or
selection by the class counsel.8" This could be accomplished easily by re-
quiring the class attorney to distribute the solicitation form in duplicate
and to request that the solicitee mall one copy to the attorney and the
other to the retention center.8 The class attorney who wishes to solicit
should also also be required to file an affidavit indicating the potential
named plaintiff and a general outline of the prospective cause of action.
This would authenticate the basis for solicitation and alert the court that
responses will be arriving.
The uncensored, solicited information in the court's possession will pro-
vide the attorney with an incentive to depict the proposed class accurately
in subsequent stages of litigation. If conflicts or antagonisms exist, con-
cealment will become extremely difficult and potentially harmful to the
attorney's credibility. The class attorney would be forced to reconcile such
conflicts prior to filing the complaint or, if the interests are irreconcilable,
to recognize that a class suit is inappropriate. The solicited information
should also be made available to the defendant, thus providing further
assurance that class conflicts will be identified.8 7
C. Ethical Objections to Solicitation and Attorney-Class Communication
Current restrictions on attorney-class communication are premised
upon the belief that such communication is potentially detrimental to the
Rates: Effects of Questionnaire Topic and Length and Recipients' Community, 46 PSYCHOLOGY REP.
435, 436 (1980) (people most likely to respond to questionnaire when particular subject is relevant to
them).
85. This method of handling class information will be particularly useful in determining the ne-
cessity of intervention and in facilitating the use of procedural devices to upgrade adequacy of repre-
sentation. Class counsel may exclude from the class definition certain solicited potential class members
who have some relation to the underlying adjudication. Such exclusion may be attributable to an
irreconcilable conflict of interest, and places the trial court on notice as to potential class members who
may need a representative advocate to prevent prejudice to their interests as a result of adjudication of
the class claim. See supra note 9 (trial judge may allow permissive intervention to upgrade
representation).
86. The information collected should remain confidential until it is made available to the trial
judge and the defendants for review in the certification process. Confidentiality is important to the
litigation posture of the soliciting attorney; it is necessary to protect his prerogative to select the most
advantageous forum for litigation. A potential defendant, alerted by the court to the accumulation of
information, might shop for a more favorable forum and bring a preemptive declaratory judgment
action. While the solicitation process will to some degree put the defendant on notice, it is nonetheless
essential that no official disclosure is made as to the potential lawsuit.
87. But c. supra pp. 600-01 (reliance upon defendant to identify such conflicts inappropriate).
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plaintiff, the defendant, the court and the legal profession in general."8
Opponents of attorney solicitation contend that any lawyer-initiated com-
munication process is likely to foster fraudulent or frivolous claims, 9 mis-
representation," underrepresentation or "selling-out,"'" and overreach-
ing.9 2 Under the proposed scheme these objections are satisfied; in fact, the
process of regulated communication should actually deter such abuse of
the class action device.
The prospect of close scrutiny by the court of information solicited from
potential class members will in all probability reduce the number of
fraudulent or frivolous suits. The class certification requirement is ineffec-
tive as a device for screening meritless claims to class action status unless
the trial judge possesses the requisite information during the early stages
of litigation. Regulated solicitation would thus transform this requirement
into an effective screening device. If the class allegations lack merit, it will
be difficult for the attorney to obtain the required information. Moreover,
the trial judge and defense attorneys will be able to detect deficient allega-
tions on the basis of the solicitation responses.
Lack of appropriate responses to solicitation should constitute prima
facie evidence that the class claim cannot be substantiated. 3 The court
could then require further solicitation if the managing parties persist in
maintaining a class suit; if the parties refuse to engage in further solicita-
tion or other information gathering, the court could deny class status.
Restriction of communication is also defended on the ground that it
protects potential class members from misrepresentation. Particularly
where the solicitees lack legal sophistication, it is contended that they may
be vulnerable to misrepresentations of a class attorney whose interests
may conflict with their own. It is fair to assume that a soliciting attorney
may be more likely in the class context to misrepresent the costs and bene-
fits of participation in litigation.94 But the proposed solicitation process,
unlike unregulated communication, permits subsequent evaluation of the
propriety of solicitation in any particular case. The danger of misrepre-
sentation is mitigated, therefore, rather than enhanced. The class informa-
88. See Schoor, supra note 77, at 227 (critically analyzing dangers of solicitation).
89. See Note, The Profession's Duty, supra note 77, at 1184.
90. See Schoor, supra note 77, at 227-28.
91. See id. at 229-32.
92. See Note, The Profession's Duty, supra note 77, at 1184.
93. An exception must be provided for cases in which the low response rate can be attributed to
factors unrelated to the propriety of bringing a class suit. Such factors include limited sophistication of
the respondents and fear of retaliatory action by the prospective defendant. See Seymour, The Use of
"Proof-of-Claim" Forms and Gag Orders In Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 10 CONN. L.
REV. 920, 923-29 (1978) (inability to respond effectively to claim forms may be due to lack of neces-
sary factual information or lack at legal sophistication).
94. See Developments-Class Actions, supra note 5, at 1582.
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tion generated from the regulated solicitation process will enable the trial
court and the defendants to identify any misrepresentation or need for
redefinition of the proposed class. An effective determination of compli-
ance with the class action prerequisites is the most direct method of
preventing misrepresentation by class counsel. Moreover, increased com-
prehension by class counsel of the factual situation will reduce frivolous
class suits rooted in misinformation and speculation.
It is also claimed that soliciting attorneys will underrepresent the class,
that they will settle class claims for less than they are realistically worth.95
The class members' interests supposedly will be subordinated to the attor-
ney's efforts to maximize his own income by acquiescing in a quick settle-
ment of the plaintiff's claim for an amount less than could be obtained
through greater time and effort.
The "selling-out" problem is in part attributable to the inability of the
trial court to protect the interests of the class members during the early
stages of litigation. Any settlement or dismissal of a class action is contin-
gent upon court approval. 6 Furthermore, notice of a proposed settlement
or dismissal must be given to all class members in such manner as the
court directs.97 Presumably, these powers enable the trial judge to prevent
quick settlements that are unfair to the class. The logic of a sell-out, how-
ever, requires the attorney to reach a settlement or dismissal prior to any
substantial investment of time and effort. Withdrawal of a class allegation
in a complaint or a precertification settlement agreement may be an indi-
cation that an attorney is selling out. At this stage, under current proce-
dures, the court has little knowledge of the identity and interests of the
class." Therefore, while the court possesses the power to scrutinize and
reject any proposed dismissals or settlements, that power is ineffective be-
cause the court lacks early access to the necessary class information.
Under the proposed system, this information, so crucial in dealing with
the sell-out problem, will be provided to the trial judge at the outset of
litigation. In effect, what has been identified as a cause of the sell-out
problem can be transformed into an effective remedy.
Conclusion
Enforcing compliance with the class action prerequisites is the mecha-
nism employed to ensure that the rights of absent class members are ade-
quately protected. Such enforcement is realistic only if the trial judge ob-
tains a comprehensive overview of the nature and composition of the
proposed class during the certification process. Class counsel, a critical
95. See Schoar, supra note 77, at 224-32.
96. See supra p. 603.
97. Id.
98. See supra pp. 597-98.
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source of class information, is also under an obligation to comprehend,
assess and accommodate potentially conflicting or divergent interests capa-
ble of impeding fair and adequate representation. This information should
be available during the drafting of the complaint and should be incorpo-
rated into an accurate class definition. With appropriate regulations, at-
torney solicitation of information from potential class members could pro-
vide the class attorney with information needed to determine whether class
adjudication is appropriate and the trial court with the class information
necessary for an informed certification decision. This will thus contribute
to ensuring that the representative plaintiff's advocacy is tantamount to a
day in court for absent class members.
